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This paper suggests that enforcement of contracts 
could be fruitfully addressed in legal studies by 
utilizing inter-disciplinary concept of contract-
enforcement that derives from new institutional 
economics. The aim of this paper is to analyse the 
notion of contract-enforcement and its mechanisms 
including informal private arrangements that support 
court enforcement. By expanding the analysis to 
account for informal, extra-legal, socially-rooted 
arrangements one could better understand the 
functioning of legal system. This is especially 
relevant to the post-Soviet context where the gap 
between formal and informal is profound.
This paper relies on the works of scholars in 
broadly defined new institutional economics, such as 
North, Grief, Menard, Shirley, Milgrom, Weingast, 
McMillan, Woodruff and others. This approach 
combines economics, law, sociology, anthropology, 
and political science to understand social, political 
and commercial institutions [1]. It is focused on 
institutions as the interplay of written and unwritten 
rules, norms and humanly devised constraints, in their 
interactions with organisational arrangements [2, p. 1]. 
According to the founders of the new institutional 
economics, ‘the inability of societies to develop 
effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the 
most important source of both historical stagnation 
and contemporary underdevelopment’ [3, p. 54].
The importance of institutional structure for 
contract enforcement becomes even more 
pronounced in the context of post-Soviet transition. 
In the circumstances of the profound and ongoing 
changes in the post-Soviet societies, uncertainty 
doubles, the costs of obtaining information on the 
monitoring of transactions becomes very high, and 
exogenous shocks and shifts in bargaining power of 
the parties are common. Opportunistic behaviour in 
these circumstances is more likely and requires 
sufficient effort in the establishment of an 
institutional structure for contract enforcement.
Based upon assumptions of the uncertainty of 
economic action and its social embeddeness, the 
focus of contract enforcement studies has shifted 
from public courts to the contract enforcement 
strategies of businesses, resulting in the creation of 
a private order among them, constraints of the 
institutional environment, and the interrelations of 
public and private order in this process.
The change of emphasis triggered a number of 
fascinating empirical studies of private ordering in 
historical perspectives, such as the studies of the 
eleventh-century Maghribi traders by Grief [4], and 
of medieval Europe’s merchant guilds by Milgrom, 
North, and Weingast [5]. These studies depict highly 
effective autonomous, largely self-enforcing, regimes 
of private ordering which did not rely on state courts.
In a similar vein, empirical studies of contemporary 
US business by Bernstein and Richman document 
how multilateral private order mechanisms based on 
networks survived in the diamond trade and the cotton 
industry. Entry into these specific trades was restricted 
to intergenerational firms or traders with a specific 
ethnic or religious origin such as Ultraorthodox Jews. 
The rejection of trade opportunities was supported by 
non-economic sanctions of social exclusion from 
social events, wives clubs, and debutante balls in the 
cotton industry [6], and from the intimate religious 
rituals, celebrations, and life cycle events of the 
Ultraorthodox Jews who dominated the diamond 
industry [7].
Thus, a contract enforcement approach implies 
that contract enforcement is better comprehended 
in a context of a broader institutional environment 
of various levels that shapes contract enforcement 
mechanisms into a blend that is unique for each 
society. Contract enforcement which originates in 
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legal and state coercion presents only a part of the 
story, and there are many other private, informal, 
decentralized means that support contractual 
relations.
Apart from the general points noted above, the 
literature seems quite vague on defining contract 
enforcement. Many studies either explicitly or 
implicitly identify contract enforcement with 
institutions. For example, Fafchamps treats contract 
enforcement as “an institution that deters opportunistic 
breach of contract” [8, p. 427], and relies on North’s 
definition of institutions as “formal rules and informal 
constraints that govern human behaviour” [3, p. 4].
Other scholars, namely in law and economics, 
have built their research on the theories of social 
control and explored contract enforcement through 
the analysis of the economic efficiency of social 
norms [9; 10; 11; 12; 13]. For example, Ellickson 
argues that social norms developed within a private 
context are effective as they are inherently designed 
to maximize the public good without state intervention 
[9]. Thus alongside the phrase ‘contract enforcement’, 
researchers employ variety of other terms– practices, 
strategies, institutions, mechanisms, etc.
Given the variety of conflicting views, this study 
relies upon the most comprehensive approach that 
allows embracing the widest possible spectrum of 
arrangements to support contracts. Following the 
mechanism-explanatory view summarised by 
Hedstrom and Ylikoski [14], this study treats contract 
enforcement as a system of contract enforcement 
mechanisms whose operation is directed towards 
producing a clearly articulated result – the systematic 
and effective performance of contracts between 
contracting parties and the achievement of the 
economic goal of exchange.
As a complex phenomenon, the contract 
enforcement system consists of a number of contract 
enforcement mechanisms of a varied nature which, in 
contrast to the effect of the overall system, are not 
easily identifiable. Some mechanisms such as courts 
and business associations have a formal organizational 
nature; others such as a repeated exchange mechanism 
may be viewed as referring to a specific structure of 
business relationships or incentives for certain 
behaviour [15]. Some mechanisms, namely public 
courts, originate in the coercive power of the state, 
and many others in essentially private informal and 
fluctuating normative frameworks. Most contract 
enforcement mechanisms operate ex post – after the 
contract is broken and a dispute arises; yet preventive 
ex ante mechanisms such as self-enforcing contractual 
devices are increasingly acquiring greater weight in 
business. Finally, each contract enforcement 
mechanism may perform a number of various 
functions that stretch beyond the straightforward 
enforcement of contracts.
To conclude, contract enforcement is a system of 
mechanisms of a widely diverse nature that perform a 
variety of functions but are united by a single purpose – 
assuring contractual compliance and thereby 
contributing to the economic activity of society.
The diverse nature of contract enforcement poses 
certain challenges in respect to the typology of the 
mechanisms. For example, even within a single 
national context – Russia – the typologies of contract 
enforcement mechanisms can vary notably. 
Vinogradova and Hendley et al. came up with quite 
different lists of contract enforcement strategies 
identified in their studies of post-Soviet Russian 
business [16; 17]. Some of the strategies seem to 
differ only by name (self-enforcing devices in 
Hendley et al. and financial tools in Vinogradova; the 
administrative levers of state in Hendley et al. and the 
threat of punitive actions by state officials in 
Vinogradova); whereas others were explored through 
substantially different concepts such as relational 
contracting and business networks.
Moreover, there seems to be no universal agreement 
even with regard to the very broad groups of contract 
enforcement mechanisms. Following the distinction 
between formal and informal institutions made by 
North [3, p. 4], many scholars distinguish between 
formal and informal contract enforcement [18; 19; 20].
However, this approach proved to be problematic 
as some mechanisms could be described as formal 
and informal at the same time. For example, contract 
enforcement through protection agencies is referred to 
by some scholars as formal contract enforcement 
mechanisms [21], however in practice they display a 
great deal of informality. Some scholars of post-Soviet 
transition understand informal activities as explicitly 
criminal [22] or only partly lacking legitimacy [23, 
p. 192]. Therefore, the vagueness of the formal-
informal distinction of institutions has prompted some 
researchers to suggest either abandoning its use or 
using it with extreme care [24].
The distinction between legal and non-legal 
elements of contract enforcement does not seem 
reliable either. Sometimes, contract enforcement 
through the courts is labelled “legal” [25; 26] or 
“contractual” [27], indicating the actual or potential 
use of state law as opposed to extra-legal, extra-
contractual enforcement relying on conventions, 
usage, custom, or expediential rationality [25, 
p. 171–172]. However, in the post-Soviet context, 
the legal-illegal distinction is complicated by the 
possibility of “shadow” contract enforcement 
mechanisms, for example, the use of kickbacks from 
suppliers or violence by criminal enforcers. A whole 
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range of adjectives for such practices has been 
employed by researchers of the post-Soviet 
transition – “semilegal, extralegal, quasilegal, 
supralegal, non-legal, illegal” [23, p. 26]. All of this 
renders the distinction between legal and non-legal 
quite ambiguous.
Given the variety of conflicting views, it is 
suggested to rely upon the least controversial 
classification of contract enforcement into two very 
broad groups – public and private.
Public contract enforcement is distinct from 
private enforcement as it relies on fundamentally 
different type of resources – state coercion supported 
by the state bureaucratic apparatus. In the context of 
business-to-business relations, public contract 
enforcement is confined to public courts. Thus for the 
purposes of this research, public contract enforcement 
encompasses dispute resolution by the state courts 
and state agencies on behalf of the state. Private 
mechanisms include all the remaining mechanisms 
stemming from the community or the business – 
trade associations, private arbitration, mediation, 
repeated dealings, reputational mechanisms, etc.
The distinction between public and private 
contract enforcement does not exclude from analysis 
those devices that have a mixed public-private nature. 
In the context of post-Soviet business, such border-
line mechanisms include, for example, pretenziya – 
formal letters written under a specific template and 
addressed to the delinquent trading partner. On the 
one hand, a pretenziya is a solely private bilateral 
mechanism, as no state or governmental agency gets 
actually involved in its operation. Pretenziya is 
exchanged between two trading partners with 
discretion and concerns their commercial relations. 
On the other hand, a pretenziya relies heavily on the 
threat of public courts. It most noticeably transforms 
a bilateral disagreement into a legal dispute through 
legal discourse and the threat of legal sanctions. Thus 
pretenziya constitutes a bridge between the private 
and public realms, as well as the business and legal.
Compared to state courts, private contract 
enforcement mechanisms are generally more diverse, 
informal, intangible and complex.
Contract enforcement invariably begins as bilateral 
contractual arrangement between two or more parties 
to the relationship that accommodates a routine 
transaction and seeks to prevent disputes. Even when 
disputes arise, bilateral mechanisms are usually the 
first option of the parties in their efforts to continue 
with the transaction. A substantial transformation of 
the relationship occurs when the relationship is entered 
into by a private third party, be it mediator, arbitrator, 
trade association, or any other intermediary or audience 
who facilitates negotiations between the parties, 
adjudicates the matter, or punishes the defaulter. Thus 
private contract enforcement mechanisms fall into two 
categories: bilateral and third-party mechanisms. The 
former covers repeated dealings, prepayment, and 
personal networks, and the latter covers reputational 
mechanisms, arbitration, mediation, trade associations, 
private intermediaries, etc.
Apart from the distinction between bilateral and 
multilateral enforcement, many researchers 
distinguish between organized or designed (trade 
associations), and organic or spontaneous mechanisms 
(repeated interactions, community reputation 
systems) depending upon the details of emergence 
and degree to which institutions are codified and 
responsibility for enforcement is centralized with 
identifiable functionaries [18; 28]. According to 
Greif, organic contract enforcement mechanisms 
emerge spontaneously as “unintended and 
unforeseeable results from the pursuit of individual 
interests”; designed institutions reflect an “intentional 
and conscious design and possibly the coordinated 
responses of many individuals” [28, p. 731].
While bilateral contract enforcement mechanisms 
emerge spontaneously, multilateral institutions could 
originate either in spontaneous social processes or in 
conscious efforts and the financial investment of the 
business community in the establishment of 
organizations to support the contractual compliance of 
its members. For example, being in essence a 
multilateral mechanism, reputation is capable of 
operating as a spontaneous arrangement (uncoordinated 
gossip) as well as at a multilateral designed level 
(reputational transfers through business associations).
To illustrate this point, consider the contract 
enforcement system of the eleventh-century Maghribi 
traders researched by Greif. He showed how 
Maghribis implemented interdependent trade 
arrangements operating through overseas agents who 
comprised solely of Maghribis. The rapid circulation 
of information inside this ethnic network provided 
for the prompt detection of cheating even at distant 
localities, and made the punishment of the defaulter 
the economic interest of each network member [4]. 
The effective operation of multilateral reputation 
mechanisms in the closed networks of tight-knit 
ethnic communities was demonstrated to be feasible 
owing to the restricted number of network members 
and naturally interdependent links.
Thus, while courts as public contract enforcement 
mechanisms are always third-party, centralized and 
organized, private contract enforcement encompasses 
more diverse mechanisms – bilateral and multilateral, 
designed and spontaneous.
These complexities present certain challenges for 
empirical research into private ordering that could be 
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addressed through thoroughly designed empirical 
research methodology. By expanding the analysis to 
account for informal, extra-legal, socially-rooted 
arrangements one could better understand the 
functioning of legal system. It is crucial to view the 
contract enforcement system in its entirety, equally 
comprising the private and public, formal and 
informal enforcement mechanisms, as well as 
appreciating the role of each mechanism as a 
constituent part of this system.
References
1. Klein P. New Institutional Economics // Bouckaert B. and De 
Geest G. (eds.). Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000. – Vol. 1. – P. 456–489.
2. Menard C. Handbook of New Institutional Economics / C. Menard, 
M. Shirley. – Berlin : Springer-Verlag, 2008. – 884 p.
3. North D. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic 
Performance / D. North. – Cambridge : Cambridge University 
Press, 1990. – 159 p.
4. Greif A. Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence 
on the Maghribi Traders / A. Greif // The Journal of Economic 
History. – 1989. – Vol. 49 (04). – P. 857–882.
5. Milgrom P. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The 
Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs / 
P. Milgrom, D. North, B. Weingast // Economics and Politics. – 
1990. – Vol. 2 (1). – P. 1–23.
6. Bernstein L. Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: 
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions / 
L. Bernstein // Michigan Law Review. – 2000. – Vol. 99. – P. 1724.
7. Richman B. Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: 
Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering / B. Richman // 
Columbia Law Review. – 2004. – Vol. 104. – P. 2328–2368.
8. Fafchamps M. The Enforcement of Commercial Contracts in 
Ghana / M. Fafchamps // World Development. – 1996. – 
Vol. 24 (3). – P. 427–448.
9. Ellickson R. A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories 
of Social Control. The Journal of Legal Studies. – 1987. – 
Vol. 16 (1). – P. 67-99.
10. Cooter R. Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy / R. Cooter // 
Southwestern University Law Review. – 1993. – Vol. 23. – P. 443.
11. Bernstein L. Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking 
the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms / L. Bernstein // 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review. – 1996. – Vol. 144 
(5). – P. 1765–1821.
12. Katz A. Taking Private Ordering Seriously / A. Katz // University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review. – 1996. – Vol. 144 (5). – P. 1745–1763.
13. Posner E. Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms / E. Posner // 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review. – 1996. – Vol. 144 (5). – 
P. 1697–1744.
14. Hedstrom P. Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences / 
P. Hedstrom, P. Ylikoski // Annual Review of Sociology. – 
2010. – Vol. 36 (1). – P. 49–67.
15. Fehr E. Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: 
Experimental Evidence / E. Fehr, S. Gachter, G. Kirchsteiger // 
Econometrica. – 1997. – Vol. 65 (4). – P. 833–860.
16. Hendley K. Law, Relationships and Private Enforcement: 
Transactional Strategies of Russian Enterprises / K. Hendley, 
P. Murrell, R. Ryterman // Europe-Asia Studies. – 2000. – 
Vol. 52 (4). – P. 627–656.
17. Vinogradova E. The Big Issue of Small Businesses: Contract 
Enforcement in the New Russia. [Electronic resource] / 
E. Vinogradova // University of Maryland. – 2005. – Mode of 
access: http://drum.lib.umd.edu/handle/1903/2658 (accessed 25 
February 2014). – Title from the screen.
18. Mcmillan J. Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order / 
J. Mcmillan, C. Woodruff // Michigan Law Review. – 2000. – 
Vol. 98. – P. 2421–2458.
19. Trebilcock M. The Role of Formal Contract Law and 
Enforcement in Economic Development / M. Trebilcock, 
J. Leng // Virginia Law Review. – 2006. – Vol. 92. – P. 1517.
20. Macleod W. Reputations, Relationships, and Contract 
Enforcement / W. Macleod // Journal of Economic Literature. – 
2007. – Vol. 45 (3). – P. 595–628.
21. Радаев В. Новый институциональный подход и деформали-
зация правил в российской экономике / В. Радаев. – Мо-
сква : ГУ-ВШЭ, 2001. – 42 с.
22. Колесникова Л. Неформальный сектор: издержки «переход-
ности» или отражение социального самосознания? / Л. Ко-
лесникова // Общественные науки и современность. – 
2002. – № 5. – С. 48–65.
23. Ledeneva A. How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices 
that Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business / A. Ledeneva. – 
Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2006. – 288 p.
24. Hodgson G. What Are Institutions? / G. Hodgson // Journal of 
Economic Issues. – 2006. – Vol. XL (1). – Р. 1–25.
25. Vincent-Jones P. Contract and Business Transactions: A Socio-
Legal Analysis / P. Vincent-Jones // Journal of Law and 
Society. – 1989. – Vol. 16 (2). – Р. 166–186.
26. Charny D. Nonlegal sanctions in commercial relationships / 
D. Charny // Harvard law review. – 1990. – №104. – Р. 373–467.
27. Macaulay S. Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A 
Preliminary Study / S. Macaulay // American Sociological 
Review. – 1963. – Vol. 28 (1). – Р. 55–67.
28. Greif A. Commitment, Coercion, and Markets: The Nature and 
Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange / A. Greif // 
Handbook of new institutional economics ; C. Menard, 
M. Shirley (eds.). – Berlin Heidelberg : Springer-Verlag. 
2008. – Р. 727–786.
Кисельова Т. С.
МехАНіЗМи ВиКоНАННя догоВоРіВ 
і ВиРішеННя СпоРіВ
У статті обґрунтовано важливість неформальних приватних механізмів виконання договорів для 
більш повного розуміння судової системи в пострадянських країнах. Аналізується поняття виконання 
договорів з погляду міждисциплінарного підходу нової інституціональної економіки; розрізняються по-
няття публічних і приватних механізмів виконання договорів; характеризуються їхні основні ознаки.
Ключові слова: виконання договорів, публічні механізми виконання договорів, приватні 
механізми виконання договорів, нова інституціональна економіка.
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